Criminal disenfranchisement has become an area of great legislative ferment in the wake of the rise of the carceral state and the shadow of the 2000 presidential election. Previous research documents widespread confusion about who can and cannot vote among both people who have come into contact with the criminal justice system and election administrators. Such research, in concert with a wide-range of activists promoting the issue, has spurred a number of state legislatures to pass laws that require the state to notify ex-felons about their voting rights. The purpose of this paper is to better understand the policy processes that produce these notification laws and to assess whether these laws affect ex-felons' registration and turnout rates. Data on discharges from the correctional system and voter files are collected from three states that have recently passed notification laws: New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina. We follow recent work that matches information in these two government sources to estimate the rates of ex-felon registration and turnout. Our findings show little evidence of an increase in ex-felon registration or turnout after notification laws are implemented.
Introduction
Criminal disenfranchisement has increasingly become a contested criminal justice and electoral administration issue as wide swaths of the electorate are denied the vote. States have substantial autonomy to restrict the voting rights of those with criminal convictions and they have enacted policies that range from no voting restrictions at all to lifetime disenfranchisement. An estimated 5.8 million citizens -or 2.5 percent of the voting age population -nearly half of whom had already completed the terms of their sentence, were legally disenfranchised in 2010 (Uggen, Shannon and Manza, 2012) .
Estimates of the legal disenfranchisement rate may actually understate the effects of criminal disenfranchisement if disenfranchisement laws cause citizens with voting rights to not vote. One form of such de facto disenfranchisement occurs when non-disenfranchised individuals believe that they are ineligible to vote (Wood and Bloom, 2008 ). An ex-felon may find it challenging to learn whether he or she is eligible to vote because of both the fragmented nature of criminal disenfranchisement policy and the complexity of specific states' disenfranchisement laws. How and when voting rights are restored can vary across neighboring states and depend on relatively nuanced details about the specific crime of conviction or date of discharge. Thus, it is not particularly surprising that individuals who have had contact with the criminal justice system are frequently misinformed about their voting rights (Drucker and Barreras, 2005) . Some of this misinformation is likely a result of correctional officers and election officials also holding incorrect or inconsistent beliefs about the criminal disenfranchisement policy in their state (Ewald, 2005; Allen, 2011) .
A number of state legislatures have recently considered policies designed to combat this misinformation. According to data collected by the Brennan Center for Justice, almost half of all states have a statute that requires the state to inform the criminally disenfranchised about either the loss or the reinstatement of their voting rights.
1 Notification procedures vary across states, with states differing in who communicates the information (e.g., a judge, a correctional officer, etc), when the information is communicated (e.g., upon sentencing, at discharge, etc), and how the information is communicated (e.g., verbally or in written form, in person or in a mailing, etc).
This paper investigates whether these notification requirements increase voter registration and turnout among those discharged from a felony sentence. A number of the states with notification requirements, including New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina, have passed these requirements in the last ten years. By combining criminal justice discharge records with statewide voter records, we are able to construct registration and turnout rates for those individuals completing their sentence before and after these states implement notification.
If these notification laws correct misperceptions about voting eligibility among individuals who would otherwise vote, then the registration and turnout rates of the cohorts discharged just after these laws were implemented should be higher than the registration and turnout rates of the cohorts discharged just before these laws were implemented.
However, we find little evidence that notification increases registration and turnout rates in New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina. The presidential election turnout rate among recent ex-felons is about 10 percent both before and after notification in all three states. While we cannot rule out that notification may have slightly increased registration and turnout, we can rule out the large mobilizing effects of notification that Meredith and Morse (2013) find in a similar population in Iowa. We conclude by discussing a number of potential explanations for why notification appears to have increased registration and turnout in Iowa, but not in these other states.
Relevant Literature
A growing body of research examines the political consequences of criminal disenfranchisement. The disenfranchised population is disproportionately young, male, African-American and less educated than the general population of voters (Western, Pattillo and Weiman, 2004) . African-Americans, for example, are about three times more likely to be disenfranchised because of a criminal conviction (Uggen, Shannon and Manza, 2012) . This distinct profile suggests that the political preferences of disenfranchised citizens likely differ from those of the general voting population. Seminal works by Uggen and Manza (2002) and Uggen (2004, 2006) find that Republicans candidates benefit from criminal disenfranchisement. Uggen and Manza reach this conclusion by fitting turnout and vote choice models using data on non-felons, and then using these models to extrapolate the probability that disenfranchised voters would vote and support Democratic candidates if they were eligible to vote. Their models predict that about 35 percent of the disenfranchised population would turnout in a presidential election, with about 73 percent of those who vote supporting the Democratic presidential candidate.
Subsequent work questions whether these models overstate the turnout propensities and Democratic preferences of the disenfranchised population. Uggen and Manza's (2002) approach assumes that the demographic characteristics included in their models -gender, race, age, income, labor force status, marital status, and education -capture all of the differences between the voting tendencies of felons and non-felons. But if the unobserved variables that increase political participation also negatively associate with the propensity to commit crimes, then these models would overstate the probability that the criminally disenfranchised would otherwise vote. Belief in prosocial norms, for example, may cause people to both obey the law and participate in politics (Manza and Uggen, 2006) . Consistent with this intuition, Hjalmarsson and Lopez (2010) find that observable variables only explain about half of the difference in the turnout rates of those who have been incarcerated and those who have never had contact with the criminal justice system. Studies that use public records to estimate the turnout rates of the non-disenfranchised ex-felon population also usually find smaller turnout rates than predicted by Uggen and Manza's models (Burch, 2007; Haselswerdt, 2009; Burch, 2011 Burch, , 2012 Meredith and Morse, 2013 Likewise, few of the incarcerated felons in Minnesota interviewed by Manza and Uggen (2006) understood their future voting rights. Thus, there may be a sizable number of voting-eligible ex-felons who would vote but believe, incorrectly, that they are ineligible to do so.
These informational barriers to turnout are likely compounded by the fact that criminal justice officials and election administrators are also frequently misinformed about criminal disenfranchisement policy. Ewald (2005) finds that 37 percent of election administrators either misreport or report being unaware of a key aspect of their state's criminal disenfranchisement policy. These misinformed elites likely contribute to the misinformation within the population who comes into contact with the criminal justice system. Misinformed elites may also impose additional barriers on political participation by voting-eligible ex-felons.
For example, Allen (2011) reports that nearly half of the election boards in New York asked ex-felons who attempted to register to vote to provide documentation that is not required by state law.
Many states recently have considered legislative reforms to reduce misinformation about criminal disenfranchisement. Voting rights lobbies like the Brennan Center and the Sentencing Project have made the passage of these notification bills one of their top priorities.
Yet, little is known about whether these reforms increase political participation. The only study that we are aware of examines a quasi-experiment in Iowa in which only ex-felons discharged after a certain date were mailed a letter notifying them about their voting rights being restored (Meredith and Morse, 2013 for administering notification to the criminal justice system. This may affect the probability that individuals receive the notification treatment, the informational content of the treatment, and the response to the information. Also, the Iowa treatment informed recipients about a recent expansion in voting rights, while most notification programs inform recipients about a longstanding policy.
Recent Voting Rights Notification Bills
Criminal disenfranchisement policy has been particularly dynamic over the past fifteen years, with nearly half of states making at least one policy change (Porter, 2010 Because African-Americans are disproportionately affected by criminal disenfranchisement, our expectation is that African-American legislators will act as policy entrepreneurs on this issue. Consistent with this expectation, Table 1 indicates that an African-American was at least one of the primary authors of these notification bills in six of the seven cases.
This pattern is consistent with Haynie's (2001) argument that descriptive representation is necessary for African-Americans to be substantively represented in state legislatures.
Because previous research shows that Democrats would benefit from additional ex-felon participation, our expectation is that Democratic legislators will be more supportive of no-2 In addition, Florida and Virginia passed laws mandating that the state provide information to individuals about how they can restore their voting rights. Bills were also introduced in Alabama and New Jersey that included notification requirements as part of a package of reforms that expanded the voting rights of the criminally disenfranchised. reference to personal responsibility, arguing that it was unfair to provide information about voting rights to ex-felons when the same service was not also provided to law-abiding citizens.
Given that both Pawlenty and Perry ran for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, these vetoes may have been motivated by beliefs about the Republican presidential primary electorates' preferences about ex-felon voting rights.
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The remainder of this paper evaluates whether the notification laws passed by New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina affect the rates at which ex-felons register and vote. law changed this policy so that voting rights were restored automatically upon discharge from 3 In fact, Mitt Romney, the eventual nominee, did run television ads criticizing Rick Santorum for voting in support of ex-felon voting rights in the U.S. Senate (Dinan, 16 January 2012) .
4 Louisiana is not included in our analysis because criminal justice discharge records are not public record.
prison, probation, and parole. An ex-felon who wants to register to vote needs to present a discharge certificate to their county election clerk. This certificate, which is presented in 
Constructing Turnout Rates from Public Records
Assessing how recent voting rights notification reforms affect ex-felon registration and turnout rates requires us to construct measures of ex-felon registration and turnout in these states.
The two most common ways to measure registration and turnout in the political science literature are either via actual registration and turnout data aggregated by precinct, county, or state, or self-reported registration and turnout data in individual-level survey data. Unfortunately, neither of these approaches is useful for studying the registration and turnout behavior of ex-felons. Because ex-felons make-up a small proportion of the electorate, it is difficult to detect the effects of felon disenfranchisement laws in aggregated turnout data (Miles, 2004) . Moreover, there is no survey of sufficient size that asks about both criminal history and voter turnout (Burch, 2011) .
Because these traditional ways of measuring registration and turnout are insufficient, we follow a number of recent papers that combine the information in criminal justice discharge records and state voter files to create our own measures (Burch, 2007; Haselswerdt, 2009; Burch, 2011 Burch, , 2012 Meredith and Morse, 2013) . Voter files are databases that contain the name, address, demographic information, and turnout history of all registered voters in a state. These files are public record in most states, although the cost of obtaining the data and the specific demographic information available in the file vary across states (Cooper, Haspel and Knotts, 2009 ). We search for whether there are corresponding records in the state voter file that match the information provided for each record in the discharge data. We then estimate registration and turnout rates by calculating statistics such as the percentage of criminal justice records that match at least one voter file record and the percentage that match at least one record that voted in a given election.
Implementing this matching process requires that we define a criterion for what constitutes a match between a record in the corrections data and a record in the voter file. (2013), we use placebo matching to assess the number of discharge records that match to another individual's voter file record. We permute the felon discharge records so that the date of birth or age is slightly modified. The number of voter file records that match to these fake discharge records provides an estimate of the number of erroneous matches in our actual data.
Assessing the amount of missed true matches is more difficult. To reduce the number of missed matches, we convert variants of a common name back to a root name (e.g., "Mike"
and "Mikey" are converted back to "Michael"). When computational power permits, we also expand our matching criterion to include near matches. For example, records are matched if they are the same except that the first names differ by a single character (e.g., "Michele"
and "Michelle") or the last name in one source is a subset of the last name in the other (e.g.,
'Clinton" and "Rodham Clinton") However, there are no modifications that can be made to prevent certain errors. For example, Meredith and Morse (2013) show patterns consistent with more female matches being missed because females are more likely to change their last name. As typographical errors are one of the primary causes of missing matches, the amount of this form of measurement error likely varies based on the quality of record keeping in the state.
Measurement error complicates any attempt to use matched corrections and voter file data to make comparisons of ex-felon political participation across states. These data are better suited for making the types of intra-state comparisons of political participation that we make in this paper. Our primary analysis consists of comparisons of registration and turnout rates for cohorts of individuals discharged before and after the implementation of notification laws. Many of the sources of measurement error in our estimated registration and turnout rates are likely to be constant within a state across time. Those factors that vary across time, such as moving out-of-state or death, are likely to have similar effects on the cohorts discharged just prior to and after these laws are implemented. Thus, looking at how registration and turnout rates vary among those discharged in close proximity to the onset of these laws can help us learn about whether these notification policies cause a change in registration and turnout behavior.
Data
We were able to collect discharge records and voter file data from three different states that recently passed voting rights notification laws: New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina.
This section presents the information that is available in the discharge records and voter file in each state. We then detail the procedure used in each state to match these records.
Finally, descriptive statistics are presented illustrating the results of these matches.
New York
The New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision provided us with ex-felons' full name, date of birth, current parole status, and parole status date. In New York, individuals convicted of a felony regain their right to vote when they have completed both prison and parole supervision. Thus, our analysis focuses on those individuals whose parole status is listed as "discharged", with the parole status date indicating the day on which these individuals regained their voting rights. As only an individual's most recent change in supervision status is observable in these data, the registration and turnout rates estimated for New York should be interpreted as registration and turnout rates for individuals who are discharged from parole and do not subsequently end back under the supervision.
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Our copy of the New York voter file contains the full name, date of birth, registration date, party affiliation, and voting history of all individuals registered to vote in New York in April, 2013. Registration date refers to the date that registration was last modified. This will differ from the date that registration was initiated in cases where a registrant has updated his or her address or party affiliation subsequent to this initial registration.
Parole discharge records are matched to the voter file using a process nearly identical to that described in Meredith and Morse (2013) . First, discharge records are merged to every record in the voter file that reports the same birthdate. Then the first and last names in the two sources are compared, and those merges with sufficiently similar first and last name are kept. Finally, the middle names in the two sources are compared, and the remaining merges with consistent middle names are kept. Because the middle name is often not reported in one or both sources, middle names are considered to be consistent if either source is missing a middle name. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the matches obtained using the matching procedure described in the previous paragraph. The first column of the first row shows that The final three columns of Table 2 show that this population votes at extremely low rates. While some of the lack of turnout in 2008 and 2010 can be explained by some of the population being disenfranchised, only 8.3 percent vote once eligible in the 2012 presidential election. The bottom two rows of Table 2 show that the cohort that was discharged before New York began distributing informational pamphlets and voter registration forms turned out at a slightly higher rate in 2012 than the cohort discharged afterwards.
One concern discussed above is that a discharge record may be matching to another individual's voter registration record. To assess the prevalence of this type of matching, we create a dataset of placebo discharge records that are nearly identical to the actual discharge records and match these placebo records to the voter file. These fake discharge records are constructed by permuting the birthdates in the discharge records by 35 days. Rows two and three of Table 2 show that only a small number of fake discharge records match a voter file record, suggesting that we are unlikely to have many false matches in our actual data.
New Mexico
The New Mexico Correction Department provided us with information on the full name, date of birth, and discharge date for inmates discharged from the New Mexico correctional system. Discharge in New Mexico refers to the completion off all prison, parole, and probation supervision, which is when individuals convicted of a felony regain the right to vote. Only an individual's most recent discharge date is observable in these data. Thus, the registration and turnout rates estimated for New Mexico by discharge date should be interpreted as registration and turnout rates for individuals discharged on a given day who do not subsequently end up back in supervision.
Our copy of the New Mexico voter file contains the full name, year of birth, registration date, party affiliation, and voting history of all individuals registered to vote in New Mexico in February, 2009. Registration date refers to the date that registration was last modified rather than the date that registration originated.
Matching the New Mexico discharge records to the voter file is made more complicated because we observe year of birth, rather than date of birth, in the New Mexico voter file.
As a result, we cannot use date of birth as the initial variable on which we screen potential matches. Moreover, initially screening only on year of birth results in too many potential matches to feasibly search given computational constraints. Instead, we exactly match on year of birth, root first name, and root last name, and keep those matches with a consistent middle name in both sources. 8 As a robustness check, we also run the New York matching procedure initially screening on birth year for a random sample of 10 percent of the New Mexico discharges between 1/1/2005 -9/30/2008. 2.7 percent of the observations in this sample did not match to an observation in the voter file using our original matching procedure, but did match to an observation in the voter file using the more inclusive name matching procedure. Further examination revealed that a majority of these matches appeared to be a discharge record matching to another person's voter file record, suggesting that we would not want to use this matching procedure even in the absence of computational constraints. presidential election, and this rate is nearly identical among the cohort discharged before and after the state began automatically issuing discharge certificates.
One difference between New Mexico and New York highlighted by Table 3 is the number of matches we find between our placebo discharge records and the voter file. We find that when the age in the discharge data is permuted to be two years below and above the actual age that 6.2 percent and 6.5 percent of discharge records match an active registration in the voter file respectively. Because year of birth is less discriminating than date of birth, this increase in placebo matches is not surprising. The number of placebo matches indicates that even though the number of matches is somewhat higher in New Mexico, the active registration and turnout rates are likely quite similar in New York and New Mexico.
North Carolina
The North Carolina Department of Public Safety provided us with information on the full name, age at discharge, and discharge date for all inmates discharged from the correctional system. Just as in New Mexico, discharge in North Carolina refers to the completion off all prison, parole, and probation supervision, which is when an individual convicted of a felony regains the right to vote. We observe multiple discharge dates if an individual has 12 For example, we do not know whether an individual who was discharged in October, 2007 at age 23 would be 28 or 29 in April, 2013.
13 6.3 percent of the observations in this sample did not match to an observation in the voter file using our original matching procedure, but did match to an observation in the voter file using the more inclusive name matching procedure. Like in New Mexico, further analysis suggested that most of these matches were likely false matches.
what we observed in New Mexico in 2008 or New York in 2012.
14 Once again ex-felons are more Democratic than the general population of active registrants. The discharged population is both younger and more male than the general population.
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Descriptive Statistics
We also observe an individual's race in New York and North Carolina. In New York, we observe four categories of race -white, black, Hispanic, and all others -while in North
Carolina we only observe three categories of race -white, black, and all others. About half of the discharged population is black in both New York and North Carolina, with Hispanics making up an additional quarter of the discharged population in New York. Finally, we observe whether an individual was discharged from prison or from parole or probation and the amount of total time he or she served in North Carolina.
Results
Our empirical approach compares the registration and turnout rates of individuals discharged from the criminal justice system before and after New York, New Mexico, and North Carolina implement notification. Because only those people discharged after the laws are implemented receive the notification treatment, we wish to interpret any difference we observe between the turnout rates of individuals discharged from the criminal justice system before and after implementation as the effect of the law changes. The biggest threat to such an interpretation is that these cohorts differ in other ways besides their exposure to notification. We adopt an 14 The turnout rate is about two percentage points larger if we condition on not recidivating as we do in New Mexico and New York.
15 43, 31, and 26 percent of active registrants affiliate as Democrats, Republicans, and with no party or a minor party respectively. empirical specification that draws on the regression discontinuity design (RDD) literature to account for these other differences between those who are discharged before and after notification.
Graphical Analysis
Our analysis begins by plotting registration and turnout rates as a function of the date of discharge as is standard in RDD analysis. If notification laws are causing ex-felons to register and vote at greater rates, then we should observe an increase in registration and turnout that corresponds to the start of notification. 16 Most importantly, we do not observe the jump in registration rates following the implementation of notification that we would expect to observe if notification was causing a large increase in participation.
If individuals are being mobilized to register by the information and registration form provided in their discharge packet, we might expect them to register in relatively close proximity to their discharge date. However, the middle panel of Figure 1 shows no increase in registration within 90 days of parole discharge after notification begins. Only about one percent of individuals register within 90 days of discharge in most quarters. The exceptions are quarters immediately before presidential elections, when a substantially higher percentage of ex-felons immediately register to vote. Thus, while Table 2 shows a slightly higher rate of registration within 90 days in the post-notification cohort, Figure 1 suggests that this likely reflects the mobilizing effects of the 2012 presidential election rather than the effect of Put together, these figures cast doubt on the hypothesis that these state's notification programs dramatically increase registration and turnout. In all three figures we observe similar registration and turnout rates in the cohorts discharged just before and after the notification laws take effect. As these cohorts should be similar except in their exposure to notification, we would expect an increase in registration and turnout among those discharged immediately after notification begins if these laws were having a large effect on participation.
While we cannot rule out that there was a small increase in registration and turnout because of notification based on these figures, we can rule out the five to ten percentage point increase in turnout that Meredith and Morse (2013) estimate occurred in Iowa because of notification.
Empirical Specification
Having observed little graphical evidence of participation differences before and after notification, we next develop an empirical specification that tries to quantify how much participation changed after notification was implemented. The biggest challenge in doing so is that individuals who receive notification differ from those who do not in terms of the amount of time that has passed since discharge. Time since discharge may relate to registration and turnout in a number of ways. Individuals who have been discharged for longer have more opportunity to be exposed to voter registration. Time since discharge also likely reduces the probability of still residing in the state and of being disenfranchised again by a new conviction. The characteristics of those individuals discharged before and after the laws are implemented may also differ in both observable and unobservable ways as a result of populations trends or other changes in state law.
Separating the effect of notification and time since discharge involves a tradeoff between potential bias and efficiency. The most comparable individuals are those who were discharged in close proximity. Thus, comparing the participation of those who were discharged just before and after the implementation of notification provides a straightforward test of the effect of notification. However, restricting the sample in such a way restricts our statistical power to detect small differences in participation between the two cohorts. Expanding the sample to include people discharged in a wider time interval gives us more statistical power to detect differences between the two cohorts, but requires us to make more assumptions about the relationship between time since discharge and political participation. We develop a specification that includes everyone discharged after the previous presidential election to maximize our statistical power, while noting that figures in the previous section also show little difference in the participation rates of individuals discharged just before and just after notification begins.
Equation 1 illustrates how we attempt to separate the effect of notification from the effect of time since discharge. We want to estimate the determinants of whether discharge i does outcome Y i (e.g., registers or votes). Our primary parameter of interest, θ, is the coefficient on Notified i , the indicator for whether a discharge i occurred after the state implemented notification. We also include a 4th order polynomial of DischargeYears i to control for the direct effect that time since discharge has on political participation in a relatively flexible manner. 17 We control for a vector of individual level characteristics, X i , listed in Table A.1 that we observe about dischargees in each state. Assuming that i is distributed normal, we estimate the parameters in equation 1 using a standard probit analysis.
Regression Results
The results presented in Table 5 continue to show no evidence of any increase in registration and turnout after notification is implemented. There is not a statistically significant positive coefficient on being discharged after notification begins in any of the six regressions. There is a marginally significant negative coefficient on being discharged after notification in North Carolina, although this result is not robust to alternative specification.
While post-notification discharge does not relate to registration and turnout, Table 5 shows that a number of additional ex-felon characteristics do relate to the probability of registering and voting. Age, which is well known to positively relate to political participation generally in the United States (see for example Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) ), also positively relates to turnout in all three states. The increase in the probability of turnout from an additional year of age ranges from a 0.16 percentage point in New Mexico to 0.43 percentage points in North Carolina.
18 Females also register and vote at higher rates. The 17 An alternative approach would be to use a more traditional RDD specification that estimates separate polynomials for time since discharge before and after notification (Meredith and Morse, 2013) . This approach attempts to calculate the discontinuous change in political participation on the exact date that notification begins. Because we received slightly conflicting information about the exact date that the notification mandate began in some states and we cannot be sure that street-level criminal justice officials began implementing notification on this date, we decided not to use this approach.
18 All effect sizes reported holding all other variables at their sample means. Notes: Each column presents the coefficient and standard errors from a distinct probit regression. The North Carolina regressions also include unreported month of discharge fixed effects. Not all variables are observed in very state. Hispanic is included in other race in North Carolina. The excluded group is a white male discharged prior to notification in New York, a white male discharged from probation or parole in January prior to notification in North Carolina, and a male discharged prior to notification in New Mexico.
difference is particularly stark in New York where females are about seven percentage points more likely to be registered and five percentage points more like to have voted in 2012 than their male counterparts. Much smaller differences are observed in North Carolina and New Mexico. These point estimates likely understate the actual gender differences because our matching procedure is more likely to miss female matches (Meredith and Morse, 2013) .
One additional interesting relationship in Table 5 is between race and participation. Much like Burch (2011) , we find that African-Americans vote and register and higher rates than whites in both New York and North Carolina. The difference in the probability of black turnout is about five percentage points in New York and ten percentage points in North Carolina. While some of this difference may relate to Barack Obama's presence at the top of the ticket in 2008, unreported regressions also show that black turnout was about 2.5 percentage points higher in 2010 midterm election. Conversely, ex-felons who are neither black nor white vote at significantly lower rates in both New York and North Carolina.
Conclusion
Concerns about ex-felons being misinformed about their voting rights, in concert with a wide-range of activists promoting the issue, has spurred a number of state legislatures to pass laws that require the state to notify ex-felons about their voting rights. The evidence presented in this article suggests that these reforms have been unsuccessful at increasing registration and turnout among the ex-felon population. We reach this conclusion because we observe little difference in the registration and turnout rates of individuals discharged before and after the implementation of notification.
A number of caveats should be applied to our conclusion that notification has been unsuccessful at increasing participation. Although it is unlikely that we could observe these data if there was a large participatory effect of notification, there is a possibility that either sampling or specification error is masking a smaller effect. Our empirical strategy is also built on an assumption that any effect of notification on participation will occur quickly after it is implemented. There are a number of reasons why this may not occur. We cannot be sure that street-level criminal justice officials adhered to the date of implementation specified by their superiors. The success of notification may also depend on the context. For example, notification may be more effective when it occurs during a time of heightened political interest, like the period right before an election or a well-publicized law change.
We also do not interpret these results as implying that notification cannot increase participation. It is possible that notification could be ineffective because ex-felons who wish to vote already invest in learning their rights. However, the findings in Meredith and Morse (2013) suggest that a substantial number of ex-felons can be mobilized by notification. An alternative explanation for the null results is that a number of features of the notification protocols adopted by these states might limit their effectiveness. Given that these notification treatments are designed to correct misinformation about voting rights, the treatments in North Carolina and New York are striking for their lack of clarity. The voting rights information is buried in densely worded pamphlets. Presenting information in this manner may be particularly problematic given that a large percentage of the prison population does not read above a grade school level (Kozol, 1985) . Further, these pamphlets are distributed in an exit packet that often contains a lot of other important documents, and this may cause information about voting rights to get crowded out.
Contrast these treatments with the letter that Meredith and Morse (2013) found increased ex-felon turnout by five to ten percentage points in Iowa. First, this letter, two paragraphs long and written in large font, focused solely on informing ex-felons about what rights were and were not being restored upon discharge. It was also personally addressed to the dischargee, making it clear that these voting rights applied to them. Finally, the letter was sent via mail, and was thus likely to be read separately from all of the other documents distributed upon discharge.
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Finally, this paper highlights the importance of thinking about a state's disenfranchisement policy in broad terms. Much of the academic, legal, and policy literature on criminal disenfranchisement focuses on the length of time that individuals remain legally ineligible to vote. However, legal disenfranchisement is only one channel through which criminal disenfranchisement affects ex-felon turnout. A number of policies, like notification, that can affect the participation rates of the formerly disenfranchised. Because the flow of individuals out of the criminal justice system at any point in time is relatively small compared to the stock of individuals who have exited across time, the total number of voters disenfranchised in practice is likely more affected by the de facto disenfranchisement of the reenfranchised than by small distinctions in when the voting rights of the currently disenfranchised are restored.
Ultimately, this means that parties interested in increasing ex-felon political participation may find it more valuable to use their resources to develop more effective protocols with which to inform ex-felons about their voting rights than fighting legislative battles to extend legal voting rights. Appendix-7 
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